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Oil and the Economy
Between December 1987 and March 1988, oil
prices fell by nearly 4 dollars per barrel. Unlike
previous years, however, this relatively sharp
drop had little impact on oil drilling activity.
After seasonal adjustment, the number of active
drilling rigs (the "rig count") in March virtually
was unchanged from December's level.
Two factors have reduced the impact of oil price
changes on drilling activity and the economy.
Fi"rst, the increased volatility of oil prices has
made it difficult to distinguish between tempo-
rary and "permanent" shifts in prices. As a
result, drilling plans are unlikely to change
unless changing expectations about future
prices, alter the long-term profitability of drilling.
Second, the economy as a whole now is more
insulated from changes in oil prices. Because of
enhanced fuel switching capabilities and greater
fuel efficiency, households and businesses now
are better able to adjust consumption in
response to changes in oil prices. Consequently,
the effects of price changes are less disruptive
than those observed in the 1970s.
Permanent vs. temporary
In the past two and a half years oil prices have
been highly volatile. Since December 1985,
monthly percentage changes in oil prices have
been more than 11 times larger than those
observed before the 1986 oil price collapse.
Increased volatility has made it more difficult to
distinguish permanent changes in oil prices from
temporary changes. Prices now fluctuate daily in
response to data releases, announcements by
OPEC ministers, and events in the Iran-Iraq war.
The particular factors causing a price movement,
however, seldom signal a permanent change in
the underlying market forces determining the
long-term price outlook.
Recent price movements, in particular, appear to
be largely seasonal in natu.re. Prices fell in the
first quarter of this year as households and busi-
nesses ran down inventories of heating oil. As
refiners begin to build inventories of gasoline,
analysts expect prices to rise in the late spring
J
and early summer months. They expect prices to
weaken again at the end of the summer as those
inventories are reduced, and then to strengthen
in the fall as heating oil inventories are
replenished. High storage costs and uncertainty
about future prices discourage refiners from
adjusting inventories to eliminate such seasonal
price fluctuations.
Drilling response
Because the decision to drill is based on the
expected profitability of the flow of oil from the
well over long periods of time, drilling plans are
not adjusted significantly if price movements are
perceived to be seasonal and temporary. Thus,
unless political events in the Middle East, further
rifts in OPEC discipline, or OPEC's success in
cutting production disrupt this seasonal pattern,
drilling activity likely will respond very little to
oil price changes.
This change in the relationship between drilling
activity and oil prices is apparent in the timing
of the oil industry's response to price shocks. To
see this more clearly, it is instructive to divide
the period since January 1974 into four sub~
periods corresponding to general movements in
oil prices. The period from January 1974 to Jan-
uary 1981 covers the period of rising prices;
February 1981 to November 1985 covers the
period when prices began falling; December
1985 to August 1986 covers the collapse in oil
prices; and the subperiod since September 1986
covers the recent firming in oil prices.
A comparison of the industry's response to oil
price changes during the four subperiods
provides evidence of significant changes in
behavior. According to estimated relationships,
the speed with which the industry adjusts to a
hypothetical permanent change in oil prices has
changed over these periods. In the first two sub-
periods, 90 percent of the adjustment to a price
change took between two and five years. In the
"crash" period between December 1985 and
August 1986, this adjustment took less than six
months. More recently, adjustment time has
risen and is approaching 12 months.FRBSF
These changes in the relationship between drill-
ing activity and oil prices reflect two factors:
structural changes in the industry, such as cor-
porate restructuring, and changes in the level of
uncertainty about the direction of oil prices. The
drop in oil prices after 1981 caused the industry
to reduce operations and overhead. Conse-
quently, producers' ability to respond quickly to
permanent shiftsin oil prices increased.The
effect of improved efficiency in operations is
evidentin the shorter response time to price
movements in the later subperiods than in the
two earlier subperiods.
Recent changes in the level of uncertainty about
oil prices, have to some extent, offset these
improvements in producers' ability to respond to
price changes by increasing the time needed to
recognize that a permanent price change has
occurred. During the price crash, the industry's
rapid response largely was the result of its realiz-
ation that the price changeswere permanent.
The industryquickly scaled back drilling plans
from those that were profitable at $25 per barrel
to those profitable at $15 per barrel. In contrast,
more recent price movements have generated
less immediate responses because the move-
mentsare generally believed to be temporary
and/or seasonal.
The long-term effect on drilling of a permanent
change. in oil prices also has changed over time,
reflecting adjustments in investment strategies. A
10 percent "permanent" increase in real oiI
prices currently yields only a long-run 7.7 per-
cent increase in the rig count, compared to an
estimated 10 to 11 percent change in the
pre-1981 and "crash" subperiods, and 19 per-
cent in the 1981-85 period.
This pattern indicates important shifts in long-
term expectations over time. The largest long-
run effect of oil prices was registered in the
1981-85 period when evidence mountedthat
prices were too high. Large adjustments in drill-
ing plans were required to scale back explora-
tion arid development efforts. In contrast, the
more recent period has been characterized by
smaller longcrun adjustments because long-term
expectations largely have been unchanged.
The evidence of reduced responsiveness to oil
price movements given the present uncertainty
about future oil prices is consistent with survey
responses. When asked about the impact of
recent weakness in oil prices, industry respond-
ents generally indicate that they have not
changed their plans for drilling and do not
expect to do so unless it appears that prices will
sink lower and will remain at those lower levels.
Direct effects
These changes in the energy sector's responsive-
ness to changes in oil prices have important
implications for real GNP, particularly for aggre-
gate investment. Direct investment by the oil
and gas extraction sector has been an important
component of real GNP in recent years. In GNP
accounting, total footage drilled in oil and gas
wells is considered a tangible investment in
structures. Chart 1 shows that this activity has
accountedfor as much as 25 percent of nonresi-
dential investment in structures and over 1 per-
cent of total GNP.
Changes in oil prices, therefore, have had a
direct impact on real GNP through this invest-
ment channel. Rising oil prices in the
1979-1981 period expanded drilling effort and
had a positive effect on GNP. Then, beginning
in 1985, when prices began to fall, investment
in drilling collapsed and GNP growth slowed.
The recent oiI price changes may not have as
large an impact on GNP as in earlier periods.
Because recent price changes are viewed as
temporary and not indicative of long-run trends,
drillers are less likely to change their plans when
prices change, making aggregate investment less
sensitive to changes in oil prices.
Indirect links
In addition to this direct investment link to GNP,
structural changes in the energy dependence of
other sectors of the economy also have signifi-
cantly diminished the impact of oil price
changes on GNP growth. Households and non-
energy-related businesses have made adjust-
ments that enable them to shift from oil to other
sources ofenergy more easily if prices rise.
In the past, oil price changes have had a wide-
spread impact on the economy because oil is
used either directly orindirectly by nearly all
production processes. For example, falling oil
prices in 1985 and 1986 reduced employment
in and profitability of energy industries, but also
reduced the operating costs of energycintensiveChart 1
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producers such as airline and transportation
companies, and reduced heating and gasoline
costs for households.
These links between oil prices and the economy,
in fact, have been very apparent since the
1973-74 oil embargo.Major increases in oil
prices - and spot shortages ~ are widely
believed to have contributed to the depth of the
1973-75 and 1980 recessions. Sudden increases
in energy prices depressed profits and income,
and led to reduced aggregate demand. Dis-
parities between the efficiency of new and old
production facilities and differences in heating
costs caused sharp differences in the costs of
production among plants and regions. The older,
less energy efficient plants and industries tended
to experience the highest unemployment and
the largest production cutbacks as they adjusted
to the higher oil prices. Consequently, aggregate
income fell during these adjustment periods.
Investment in efficiency
Because the impact of price shocks has been so
severe in the past, households and businesses
have made substantial investments in energy
efficient plant and equipment. Automobile com-
panies have increased sharply the fuel efficiency
of cars. Homeowners have invested in insulation
and more efficient appliances. Businesses have
undertaken major investment projects to
upgrade the energy efficiency of their produc-
tion processes and to reduce their dependence
on oil as an input.
Ability to substitute among fuels also has
become increasingly important as oil price vol-
atility has risen. Many large users of energy have
installed generators capable of switching quickly
between oil and natural gas to minimize costs
when relative fuel prices shift.
As a consequence of these adjustments, the
economy has moved away from its rei iance on
oil. The ratio of energy consumption, par-
ticularly oil consumption, to GNP has fallen,
indicating a movement away from oil and
energy in favor of other inputs. (Chart 2) More-
over, empirical studies generally support the
view that consumers and business now have
substantially greater ability to substitute away
from oil in the event of price increases.
Net effect
As a result of higher price volatility and a more
insulated economy, current changes in oil prices
are less likely to induce changes in real GNP.
Price changes still will have effects on income as
they change the profitability of oil companies
and the energy bills of energy users, but the dis-
ruptive effects on U.S. industrial structure
observed in the past are not likely to recur in the
present environment. Only if a major - and
permanent - change occurs in the oil market,
such as a dramatic change in OPEC's cohesive-
ness, will oil price movements cause significant
changes in the real economy.
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